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Summary  findings
Using the lens of social capital - especially bridging or  organizational capacity of the poor are critical.
cross-cutting ties that cut across social groups and  Interventions are also required to foster bridging ties
between social groups and government - provides new  across social groups - ethnic, religious, caste, or racial
insights into policy design.  groups. Such interventions can stem from the state,
Solidarity within social groups creates ties (bonding  private sector, or civil society and include:
social capital) that bring people and riesources  together.  Changes in rules to include groups previously
In unequal societies, ties that cut across groups (bridging  excluded from formal systems of finance, education, and
social capital) are essential for social cohesion and for  governance, at all levels.
poverty reduction. The nature of interaction between  *  Political pluralism and citizenship rights.
state  and society  is characterized  as complementarity  and  *  Fairness  before  the law for  all social  groups.
substitution.  WX'hen  states  are functional,  the informal  - Availability  of public  spaces  that  bring  social groups
and  formal  work  well  together  - for  example,  together.
government  support  for community-based  development.  - Infrastructure  that  eases communication.
When  states  become  dysfunctional,  the informal  e  Education,  media,  and  public  information  policies
institutions  become  a substitute  and are  reduced  to  that  reinforce  norms  and values  of tolerance  and
serving  a defensive  or  survival  function.  diversity.
To move toward  economic  and  social well-being,  states
must  support  inclusive  development.  Investments  in the
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Increasing attention is being paid, in the World Bank and elsewhere, to the social aspects
of development. A country's economic development is embedded in its social organization, and
addressing  structural  inequities  requires  not  only  economic  changes  but  also  societal
transformation (Stiglitz, 1998). But social phenomena are so all-pervasive, and often so vaguely
defined, that taking them into account in a systematic  way is actually very difficult. One approach
to untangling and analyzing some of the social forces at work in development is through the
concept of social capital. 2 The tern  refers in general to the glue that holds groups and societies
together - bonds of shared values, norms and institutions (see Section 2, page 4 below for a fuller
discussion). This paper concentrates on two aspects of social capital, "cross-cutting ties" and the
interaction between informal and formal institutions. This interaction is characterized as one of
complementarity or  substitution.  Although the focus is narrow, the paper argues that these
elements of social capital and their interrelationship  help explain a number of puzzles, and have
important  implications for policy.  The argument, in brief, is as follows.
- All societies are built from social groups  rather than individuals, and these groups determine
attitudes, beliefs, identities and values, as well as access to resources and opportunities - and
ultimately access to power.  Since most societies are not homogeneous, but are divided by
class, caste. religion and ethnicity,  groups differ in their access to resources and power. There
may be high social capital within a group ("bonding" social capital) which helps members, but
they may be excluded from other groups (they lack "bridging" social capital) 3.
*  Cross-cutting ties between  groups open up economic opportunities to those belonging to less
powerful or excluded groups.  They also build social cohesion, a critical element in social
stability and economic welfare over any extended period.  Social cohesion requires not just
The framework  for this paper was discussed  at a two-day research  workshop  held at the World Bank in June
1998.  Michael Walton, Gloria Davis, Ishac Diwan, Emmanuel Jimenez, and Christiaan Grootaert made valuable
comments on an earlier (November 1998) draft.  Michael Woolcock, Mike Edwards, Anirudh Krishna and John
Blaxall contributed useful comments on the present version.  Veronica Nyhan and Magdalena Syposz provided
valuable research assistance.
2  The term dates back at least to  1916, but was popularized  in the  last decade by the work of James Coleman
(1988) and Robert Putnam (1995).  A thorough review of the history and main concepts covered under the rubric
of social capital can be found in Michael Woolcock (1998).
3See  Gittell and Vidal (1998) and Warren et al. (1999) for a discussion of bonding and bridging social capital.
Ihigh social capital within groups.  It also requires dense, though  not necessarily  strong,  cross-
cutting ties among  groups.
*  Formal  institutions  grow out of and are embedded  in societies,  and they  typically  reflect the
interests  of  the  more  powerful.  Political  systems  have  usually  evolved  to  introduce  some
degree of restriction on their power.
*  State  and  society  interact  - in  particular  through  relationships  of  complementarity  and
substitution.  A simple framework  of analysis  is offered  in which the  institutions  of the  state
vary  from  ineffective  to  well-functioning  along  the  vertical  axis,  and  the  extent  of  cross-
cutting  ties  varies  from  low  to  abundant  along  the  horizontal  axis.  The  four  resulting
quadrants  are  characterized  as  well-being  (well-functioning  government  complemented  by
abundant  cross-cutting  ties), exclusion  (well functioning  government,  low cross-cutting  ties),
conflict  (poorly  functioning  state  and  low  cross-cutting  ties),  and  coping  (abundant  cross-
cutting  ties substituting for poorly functioning  government).
*  The four types represented  by the quadrants  are shown to correspond  reasonably  closely to the
empirical  evidence  available  about the  situation  in a  number  of countries  (and  communities
within countries).
Some  of  the  policy  implications  for  governments,  the  private  sector  and  civil  society
organizations  are then  sketched out.  First, it is vital to invest in the organizational  capacity  of the
poor.  This requires investment  at the micro level, and also changes  in rules and laws at the macro
level, in order to support associational  activity.  A second critical area of investment  is in fostering
cross-cutting  ties  (or bridging  social capital)  among  groups.  The  paper suggests  that  sensitively
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Section  2,  immediately  following  this  introduction,  provides  some  definitions  and  key
concepts  as background  to the  argument.  Section  3 then  presents  the  analytic  framework,  and
Section  4 reviews the  empirical evidence  supporting  it.  The paper concludes  in Section  5 with a
discussion  of policy implications.
2SECTION 2: DEFINITIONS AND KEY CONCEPTS
A human  becomes a human because of other humans.
African proverb.
Concepts  like social capital  and social exclusion  have  gained wide currency,  as evidence
accumulates  that  the  same policies  implemented  in different  national  institutional  environments
have  different  impacts.  Indeed, the same policies  have differential  impact even  within the  same
nation.  Moreover,  because of the inherent  power asymmetry  between social groups,  social capital
leads to negative as well as positive outcomes,  ranging from social exclusion,  corruption,  and co-
option  of the  state to conflict  and  violence.  The challenge  is to  understand  better  the  nature  of
social capital, and the circumstances  under which it is likely to lead to the public good.
For this  purpose  it is necessary  first to  define and  distinguish  some of the  'social'  terms
currently  used to focus  attention  on the  importance  of social  relations  in economic  development
and poverty  reduction.  These include social capability,  social exclusion,  social  capital  and civic
engagement.  There  is considerable  overlap  among  these  concepts,  all  of which  have  to  do with
social arrangements.  The next few paragraphs  describe each of these concepts briefly, and explain
why  the  concepts  of social  capital and  a particular  form  of social  capital,  cross-cutting  ties,  are
used  in  this  paper.  The  remainder  of  Section  2  then  addresses  the  theoretical  basis  for  the
framework  proposed later, in Section 3.
SOCIAL  CAPABILITY
The term social capability was coined by Adelman and  Morris in the  1960s, and has been
popularized  by Nobel  Laureate Amartya  Sen to mean  the aggregate  version  of human  capability,
which  includes  basic  human  necessities  such as food,  shelter,  health,  education.  Their  absence
leads to human deprivation.  Sen has framed his work on human capability  and deprivation  around
the  importance  of  broad  'freedoms',  such  as  freedom  of  the  press,  freedom  of  individual
expression,  freedom  to  participate  in public  discussion,  a fair judiciary,  in effect,  social justice.
But his great contribution  to poverty reduction  strategies has been focusing  attention on individual
capabilities  and deprivation,  and on human development  indicators (Sen  1992, 1997). Despite  the
3use of the word  social, the concept  remains  in essence an aggregation  of individual  capabilities.
Only  in his most recent work does he outline how the concept of social capability  could be useful
in framing  the debate  around  relational  issues such as social exclusion.  Social capability  "is the
ability to take part in the life of the community,  to participate  in social activities,  to have  a sense
of belonging  in the  larger  groups..."  (Sen,  1997). However,  this  work  is  at  an  early  stage  of
conceptual  development  and  empirical  application,  and  the  mechanisms  for  moving  from  an
aggregate  of human  development  indicators to social relational measures  remain  unspecified.  The
term  "social opportunity"  used by Sen and Dreze may be the closest  approximation  to what other
researchers  mean by social capital (Dreze and Sen, 1995).
SOCIAL EXCLUSION
Broadly  defined,  social  exclusion  refers  to the  societal  and  institutional  processes  that
exclude certain  groups from full participation  in the social, economic, cultural  and political  life of
societies.  The  concept  goes  beyond  the  focus  on  income  deprivation  as  a  cause  for
marginalization  of individuals  or social groups (Gore  and Figueiredo,  1997), since people  can be
poor without  being socially excluded  or excluded  without  being poor.  Like social capital,  social
exclusion  has  quickly  become  an  umbrella  concept  to  highlight  the  role  of  social  factors  and
institutional  processes that lead to exclusion and deprivation.  Like social capital, the contribution
of the  concept  is the debate  and attention  it has focused  on  social structures,  social  and political
processes  and  how  these  impact  access  to  power,  resources  and  the  lives  of  different  social
groups.  However,  unlike  social  capital,  because  the  focus  is  on  broad  processes,  a  unified
conceptual  framework  has  not yet  emerged.  "Indeed,  social  exclusion  seems  to  have  gained
currency  in part because it has no precise definition and means all things to all people"  (Atkinson
and  Hills,  1998, p. 13).  Atkinson  and Hills  draw  attention  to three  aspects  of  social  exclusion.
First, it is relative -- exclusion  is from a particular  society, at a particular place and time.  Second,
it implies an act of exclusion and hence an agent or agency.  And finally it has a dynamic  aspect --
people are excluded  not just  because they are currently without  a job  or income,  but because  they
have  little  prospect  for  the  future.  While  the  conceptual  debate  continues,  there  is extensive
4empirical  work highlighting  the range of social, political,  institutional,  and cultural processes  that
lead to the marginalization  of sizeable groups in society.4
There  are overlaps  between the  terms  social  exclusion  and  social  capital.  Both  include
participation  or  involvement  in decision  making,  including  political  decision  making,  and  both
focus  analytically  on  those  included  or  excluded.  As will  be seen  in the  discussion  of  social
capital  below,  social  groups  and networks  only  work  by  including  some  and  excluding  others.
The challenge  in using both concepts  is to differentiate  between exclusion  which  is voluntary and
exclusion  which  is  involuntary  or coercive  -- based  on  criteria  such as age,  race,  caste,  tribe,
gender,  location, class or income.  The importance  of this  difference  is central  in the sociological
literature.  Weber  (1947) characterizes  social relations  as open where  participation  is not limited
or denied, and as closed where outsiders are excluded.
Both concepts,  social  exclusion  and social  capital, raise  implicitly  the question  of power
differentials,  although this  was mostly absent from the early  social capital debate  as it evolved  in
the  US.  Social capital  can explain  much  social  exclusion,  because  the  same  ties that  bind  also
exclude.  The  non-overlapping  nature  of  social  networks  of  different  social  groups  results  in
unequal  opportunity  to  participate.  Hence those  who  belong  to  social  networks  which  already
have access to the resource  allocation decisions  of the state or the private  sector (jobs, location  of
industry)  are much more likely to continue to be included  in societal processes than those who  do
not have  such access.  This  interpretation  is strengthened  by the finding  that  income  inequality
remains  quite  stable across  time, even during  periods  of economic  growth (Li, Squire,  and Zou,
1998).  Recent critics have highlighted the fact that in socially differentiated  or unequal  societies,
social  capital  can  lead to maintaining  the status  quo of exclusion.  All focus  on  such  structural
factors  as  power,  political  opportunity,  location  of  elite  businesses  and  leadership,  and
institutional  constraints to mediate the impact of social capital.  Clearly, the composition  of social
capital  and these  institutional  factors  need to be taken  into account  in recommending  policies  to
foster  equality of opportunity.5
4 See for example Silver (1994), Figueroa et al (1998), Hashem (1996), de Haan and Nayak (1995), de Haan and
Maxwell (1998), Kudat (1997), and Dudwick (1998).
5 See further Tarrow (1996), Kentworthy (1997), Levi (1996), Heying (1997), and Skocpol (1996).
5SOCIAL CAPITAL
While  the  term  social  capital  was  used by  several  scholars6 before  Robert  Putnam,  the
public  and academic  debate  is directly  linked to the publication  of his  book Making  Democracy
Work:  Civic  Traditions  in  Modern  Italy  (1993),  which  links  the  differences  in  performance
outcomes  of 20  regional  governments  in Italy to the extent  of horizontal  civic  associations.  His
publication  of Bowling  Alone: America's  Declining  Social Capital  (1995),  and the  controversy  it
generated,  ensured that the debate continues.
The debate  on  social capital  has  brought  together  sociologists,  anthropologists,  political
scientists  and  economists.  While  differences  remain,  there  is agreement  that  in  contrast  to  all
other  concepts  central  to the development  debate,  social capital  is unique  in that  it is relational.
"Whereas  economic  capital  is in people's  bank accounts  and  human capital  is inside their heads,
social  capital  inheres  in the  structure  of their  relationships.  To possess  social  capital,  a  person
must be related to others, and it is these others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her
advantage"  (Portes,  1998). "As an attribute of the social structure in which a person  is embedded,
social  capital  is not the  private  property  of any  of the persons  who  benefit  from  it"  (Coleman,
1990). It exists only  when  it is shared.  "Social  capital  is embedded  in social  structure  and  has
public good characteristics"  (Narayan,  1997).
While the debate  is vigorous  on whether social  capital  is really  capital, whether  it should
be widely  or narrowly  defined,  and whether  it can be constructed  or is an endowment,  the active
engagement  of  scholars  and  practitioners  has  moved  the  field  forward  in terms  of  conceptual
development  and empirical  results.7 Hence the value  of this term rather than  others to explore  the
impact  of social relations.  For the purposes of this  paper,  social capital  is defined  as the  norms
and social  relations  embedded  in the social  structures of society that enable people  to co-ordinate
action  and to achieve desired goals.
6  Such as: Lyda J. Hanifan (1916) "The Rural School Community Center" Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 67: 130-138; Bourdieu (1985); Loury (1977); Coleman (1988).
7 This debate and the characteristics of social capital are discussed in Deepa Narayan (forthcoming  1999). See
also Paul Collier (1998) and Michael Woolcock and DeepaNarayan  (forthcoming 1999).
6CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
The term civic  engagement  is used by  some writers  interchangeably  with  social  capital,
and  hence  adds  no  value.  Others  restrict  the  notion  primarily  to the  use  of social  capital  for
community  and  political  engagement.  Recently,  Varshney  (1998)  made  a  strong  case  for
differentiating  between  social  capital  within  a particular  social  group  and forms  of engagement
that cut across groups.  In his case study of communal  riots in India, Varshney uses the term civic
engagement  to refer to voluntary associational  networks which  include both Hindus and Muslims,
such as those  formed for  specific professional  or issue purposes,  communal  and political  interest
groups,  and  supported  by everyday  social interaction.  But because  the term civic engagement  is
sometimes  used with a wider  meaning, this  paper has adopted the term cross-cutting  ties.  In this
paper, the term  is used to characterize social relations  in informal  or formal voluntary  groups  and
networks  characterized  by  heterogeneity  of  membership  --  that  is to  say,  ties  that  cut  across
ethnic,  gender,  caste,  class,  wealth,  religion,  location  or  any  other  characteristics  which
distinguish  social groups.
THEORETICAL  FOUNDATIONS
With  the  definitions  clarified,  it will  be  useful  to  introduce  certain  propositions  from
sociological  and political theory as a foundation  for the analytic  framework presented  in Section  3
below.  In a  recent  article,  Alejandro  Portes  (1998)  reviewed  the  sources  and  consequences  of
social  capital,  and  sketched  out a  conceptual  framework  to  understand  social  capital  and  its
function  in different  contexts.  Portes differentiates  two sources  of social capital, and two kinds  of
consequence.  One  source  he  calls  consummatory,  deriving  from  socialization  processes  in
families,  kin  networks,  class  and  occupational  groups;  and  the  other  he  calls  instrumental,
entailing  purposive  exchanges  based  on expectations  of reciprocity.8 He also points  out that the
outcomes can be either positive  or negative.
Portes and  many others  have  shown  how positive  outcomes  operate through  and  include
social  control  or norm  observance,  family  support  and  benefits  mediated  through  extra-familial
networks.  These  affect  a  broad  range  of  outcomes  from  education  to  income,  to  health,  to
s Consummatory  sources  can be seen as related  to the endowment  of social capital,  while instrumental  sources
exemplify the constructability of  social capital.  Obviously, long term  changes  in social processes affect  the
nature of the underlying endowment, and what was considered exogenous becomes endogenous in the long run.
7performance  of firms,  to collective  action  at the community  level.9  The value  of  social  control
lies  in making  formal  or overt  controls  unnecessary.  Examples  include  not  violating  the  law
simply  because  no one  is watching,  and  family expectation  for  children  to do  well  in school  to
avoid  bringing  shame  on  not only  the  family  but the  whole  community  (Zhou  and  Bankston,
1996).  The  positive  benefits  of  solidarity  networks  can  also  be  seen  in  the  opening  up  of
economic  and  employment  opportunities  within  ethnic  groups,  poverty  reduction,  and  increased
gender and racial equality.'°
There are, however, also negative consequences  to consider.  The same ties that bind also
exclude.  Powerful  networks  can restrict access to opportunities,  for example the caste  system  in
India, with  its rigid  boundaries.  Social capital restricts  individual  freedom  (women  in purdah  in
northern  India),  and  can  lead to  excessive  claims  on  successful  group  members  -- so  excessive
that  successful  individuals  are sometimes  driven to  break  off ties  with  the  larger  ethnic  group.
Solidarity  networks can also lead to downward  leveling mechanisms  (Portes,  1998).  Researchers
could find only one explanation  for differences  in academic performance  between white and black
students from the  same middle to upper  income  groups  in a  suburban  school  in Ohio  -- the peer
pressure  on  black teenagers  who took  schoolwork  seriously.  They  were labeled  as "trying  to be
white",  and  ridiculed  by  their  peers (Fletcher,  1998).  And  sometimes  the  negative  impacts  of
social  capital  are manifested  in powerful,  tightly  knit social  groups,  that  are  not accountable  to
citizens at  large, and practice  corruption  and cronyism  (Evans,  1989; Mauro,  1995; World  Bank,
1997).
Thus  societies  can  be  rich  in  social  capital  within  social  groups,  and  yet  experience
debilitating  poverty, corruption  and conflict.  To understand why,  it is necessary  to examine  three
other phenomena:  first, the connectedness  or cross-cutting  ties between groups;  second, the nature
of the state; and third, how the state interacts with the distribution  of social capital.
'  References  include: for education outcomes Teachman et al (1997), Knaul  and Patrinos (1998), Braatz  and
Putnam (1998), and Francis et al (1998); for income outcomes (Burt, 1997), Montgomery (1991), Belliveau et al
(1996), Narayan and Pritchett (1997), Grootaert (1998), Robison and Siles (1997), and Simpson et al (1992); for
health outcomes Kawachi et al (1997a,  1997b): for performance of firms Barr (1998), Fountain (1997), Kantor
(1995),  Brautigam (1997),  Fafchamps (1996), Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996), Gulati (1995);  for collective
action at the community level Narayan and Nyamwaya (1996), Molinas (1998), and Grootaert (1998).
'0 See, for example, on ethnic groups Zhou (1992) and Nee, Sanders and  Sernau (1994);  on poverty Narayan
(1997); on gender Blackwood (1997) and O'Connor (1990); and on race Jiobu (1988) and Waldinger (1995).
8On the subject of cross-cutting  ties, several writers have pointed  to the  importance  of ties
outside  the  primary  network  as a  means to access  resources  and  power outside  the  group.  Two
authors  stand  out  for their  contributions  in this  area.  Granovetter  (-1973) is renowned  for  his
phrase  "the  strength  of weak ties."  He also  drew attention  to the  importance  of ties  beyond  the
immediate  circle and of "coupling  and decoupling"  from tightly knit small family  or ethnic  based
economic  groups to more expansive, loosely knit networks, with richer  resources to achieve  social
and economic  mobility (Granovetter  1995). The other is Glen Loury.  The main conclusion  from
his  now  famous  study  (1977)  of  black  youths  is  that  youth  from  minority  groups  are
disadvantaged  by  lack of information  on job  opportunities  and  parental  connections  to the  labor
market  rather than  discrimination  by employers.  Put simply, their  parents are much  less likely to
know where the jobs  are or whom to call.
Turning  to  the  nature  of the  state,  its core  characteristics  are  a  geographically  defined
community  and a government  comprised  of formal institutions  that embody political authority.  A
government  is considered  legitimate  "to the extent that its claim  is grounded  in moral or political
principles  generally acceptable  to its people and so long as its actions remain consistent  with those
principles"  (Magstadt  and  Schotten,  1984).  When  states collapse,  they  lose their ability to fulfil
three  basic  functions:  as sovereign  authority  (the accepted  source  of  identity  and  the  arena  of
politics); as an institution (a tangible organization  for decision  making  and an intangible  source of
identity);  and  as the  security  guarantor  for  the  population  within  a  defined  territory  (Zartman,
1995).
Several  theorists  have  pointed  to  social  relations,  informal  norms  and  expectations  to
explain  the  performance  of  very  different  types  of  state  regimes.  For  example,  O'Donnell's
analysis  of state performance  in Argentina,  Brazil  and Peru is based on the premise that states are
embedded  and  interwoven  in complex  ways with their respective  societies  (O'Donnell,  1993).  In
other  words,  a state  is not just  the state apparatus,  but a set of social relations  which  establishes
social  order and backs  it up with a centralized  coercive guarantee  within a given territory.  Many
of these  relations  are codified  in the legal system.  The  laws and  the  underlying  norms provide
society  with the most important  public goods,  namely generalized  social predictability  and  broad
equality  among  citizens  (not just  political rights,  but the  right to fairness  from  the state and  the
legal system).  This is not to say that the social order is in fact socially impartial.  On the contrary,
recent research  has demonstrated  systematic class bias in the administration  of justice  (O'Donnell,
91993),  and  current  news  stories  continue  to  draw  attention  to  the  problem".  Schattscheiner
(1963)  captured  the  reality  in  his  now  famous  observation  that  "in  the  pluralist  heaven,  the
heavenly  chorus sings with a strong upper class accent."
Many  studies  have  shown  that  democracy  has  numerous  variants,  and  does  not
automatically  lead to  state effectiveness1 2 . Another  critique  comes from those  who  point to the
problems  of transferring  Anglo-Saxon  democratic  institutions  to  other  parts of the  world,  when
their  core  assumption  is  homogeneous  societies,  consisting  of  autonomous  individual  citizens
(Lijphart,  1991).  On  the  contrary,  the  defining  characteristic  of  many  modem  societies  is
heterogeneity  of ethnicity, caste and religion.  In countries with deep societal divisions,  "majority
rule  is totally  immoral,  inconsistent  with the  primary  meaning  of democracy,  and  destructive  of
any prospect of building  a nation in which different  peoples may  live in harmony"  (Lewis,  1965).
Making  democracy  work  in these circumstances  requires mechanisms  and processes  to  reconcile
conflicts  among  major  social  groups,  as well  as  among  individuals  or  smaller  and  narrowly
focused interest groups.
But no national  level political model adequately  explains  variations  in state performance,
or variations  in inter-ethnic  collaboration  or ethnic violence within a country.  To do this requires
examining  more  deeply the  nature of civil society within countries,  and  the state as shaping  and
being  shaped  by  the  action  of  civil  society  actors.  While  the  debate  about  precisely  what
constitutes  civil  society continues,  it can be broadly  defined  as the  space that exists  between  the
family and the state, which makes interconnections  between individuals  and families  possible, and
which  is independent  of the state.  It is defined in terms of its purpose, the public good, rather than
its form  (Varshney,  1999).  It includes  interactions  in everyday  social  life as well as interactions
within associations,  based on ascriptive,  traditional or modern characteristics  such as education  or
civic or political interests.
The  emergence  of  associational  forms  of  civil  society  is shaped  by  citizenship  rights.
When political and state institutions  are seen as sets of social relations,  citizenship  rights acquire a
much  broader meaning than the right to vote or political representation.  Social citizenship,  a term
"1  Among many  recent  examples  in the press  is the shooting  of Amadou  Diallo,  an immigrant  from Guinea  and a
street vendor  in  New York. He  was killed  on February  4 1999  by two  white police officers,  who fired 41 bullets
at him. Mr Diallo  was unarmed  and  had no criminal  record.  (Washington  Post,  February  12, 1999)
12 See,  for example,  Isham,  Kauffmann  and Pritchett  (1997),  Kohli (1990),  Whitehead  (1993),  and Przeworski  et
al (1996).
10emerging  from Townsend's  studies of poverty  (1995), refers to the rules and customs that govern
de facto equal participation  in the society in which one lives.  Inclusive citizenship, a term used by
Kitschelt  (1993) or low intensity  citizenship  (O'Donnell,  1993) also  draws attention  to the  fact
that presence of voting rights does not ensure equal access or equal participation in society.  Basic
freedoms  are of fundamental  importance  in all societies.  Political  scientists and  economists  such
as  Sen  have  particularly  noted  the  importance  of  a  free  press,  free  information  flow  and  the
freedom  to associate  in informal or formal groups, associations  and networks for full participation
as citizens  in society.
It is the exclusion of many from equal participation  in society, even when they  have equal
political  rights,  that  at  some  points  in  history  gives  rise  to  social  protest  movements.  While
modernization  theory  had  predicted  the  disappearance  of  solidarity  groups  based  on  religious,
ethnic,  national  or  cultural  identities,  the  reality  is  that  such  social  movements  (sometimes
including  armed conflict)  have actually  increased  in the  last few decades.  One of the few valid
generalizations  in  the  literature  on  social  protest  and  collective  mobilizations  is  that  social
movements  arise  when  aggrieved  groups  cannot  work  through  established  channels  to
communicate  new claims  into the political process  of authoritative  decision  making  (Kitschelt,
1993).  The closure of existing  avenues of participation,  such as those provided by political parties
or interest groups,  is a necessary  though  not sufficient  condition  for the emergence  of collective,
sometimes  violent,  mobilization  of  groups.  The  intensity  of  deprivation,  the  resources  of the
mobilizing  actors,  the  leaders'  strategic  skills  and  the  counter  strategies  of  opponents  all
contribute  to the success of mobilization  efforts.
To analyze the nature  of state-society  interactions,  Peter  Evans (1996), drawing  upon  the
work  of several  others,13 introduces  the idea of synergy  between  government  and  citizen action.
This  synergy  is based  on complementarity  and  embeddedness.  Complementarity  means mutually
supportive  relations  between  public and  private actors.  Examples  might  include  a framework  of
rules  and  laws  which  protect  rights  to  associate,  freedom  of assembly,  or  the  state  providing
public information  or transportation  to facilitate associations.  Embeddedness  refers to the ties that
connect  citizens  and  public  officials.  The classic  examples  are from  irrigation,  in  which  local
irrigation  officials  are from the community  being served,  and hence  are enmeshed  in local social
relations  and  pressures  to perforn.  Note, however,  that  this  enmeshment  only  works  positively
when the overall institutional context is performance  oriented  and accountable.
1  In  particular  Tendler  (1997),  Fox (1996),  Heller  (1994),  Ostrom  (1996),  and Wade  (1985).
11Woolcock  (1998) takes these  ideas further,  and proposes  a  framework  linking the  micro
and  macro  more  firmly  together  to  make  predictions  about  outcomes  of  local  levels  of  social
capital.  He  uses  the  terms  embeddedness  and  autonomy  at  both  levels.  At  the  micro  level,
embeddedness  refers  to intra-community  ties  and autonomy  refers  to extra-community  networks.
At  the  macro  level, embeddedness  refers  to state-society  relations  and  autonomy  to  institutional
capacity  and  credibility.  The important contribution  of Woolcock's  framework  is its emphasis  on
linkages outside the community,  and linkages between communities  and the state.
In brief, the structures,  rules and norms of institutions  of the state and political  systems  are
in dynamic  interaction  with the social organization  of society,  being both affected  by it and over
time effecting  change  in it.  The state creates the political  and social  space for the emergence  of
civil  society  and  citizen  action  that  provide  checks  and  balances  on  the  power  of  the  state,  so
subjecting  itself  to  public  accountability.  It  is  civil  society  that  in  interaction  with  the  state
through  contentious  politics and public  policy measures  attempts to create  new opportunities  for
those previously  excluded from full participation  in society.  Hence nurturing  social capital for the
public  good  requires  far  more  than  volunteerism  and  public  policy  support  of  voluntary
associations.
It is in this  area that the present  paper concentrates.  Its central  thesis  is that all  societies
and all  social groups have social capital.  However, for societal well  being or the collective  good,
a transition  has to occur from exclusive  loyalty to primary social groups  to networks  of secondary
associations  whose  most important  characteristic  is that they  bring together  people  who  in some
ways  are different  from the  self.  Social relations  underlie  all  social institutions  and  in turn feed
back  and  reinforce  the  organization  and  functioning  of  a  country's  formal  and  informal
institutions.  Section  3, immediately  following,  presents  an analytic  framework  to  explore  these
propositions.
12SECTION  3: THE ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK
This  section  presents  a  simple  analytic  framework  of  relationships  growing  out  of the
concepts  and  theories  discussed  in  Section  2  above.  The framework  highlights  the  interaction
between  two  key dimensions,  cross-cutting  ties and  state functioning.  The framework  permits  a
structured  examination  of  how  different  combinations  along  these  two  dimensions  affect  the
social  and economic  performance  of countries, or regions  or communities  within  countries.  The
framework  is sketched in Figure 1.
CROSS-CUTTING  TIES
The  underlying  dynamic  reflected  in  the  framework  is  that  voluntary  cross-cutting
networks,  associations  and  related  norms  based  in  everyday  social  interactions  lead  to  the
collective  good of citizens, whereas networks and associations  consisting of primary  social groups
without  cross-cutting  ties  lead to  the  betterment  of  only  those  groups.  Primary  social  group
solidarity  is the  foundation  on  which  societies  are  built.  The  impact  of primary  social  groups
depends  on  their  resources  and  power.  But  when  power  between  groups  is  asymmetrically
distributed,  it is cross-cutting  ties,  the linkages between  social groups,  that become critical to both
economic  opportunity  and social cohesion.
While  primary  groups  and  networks  undoubtedly  provide  opportunities  to  those  who
belong, they  also reinforce  pre-existing  social stratification,  prevent  mobility  of excluded  groups,
minorities  or  poor people,  and  become the  bases  of corruption  and  co-option  of  power  by  the
dominant  social groups.  Cross-cutting ties which  are dense and voluntary,  though  not necessarily
strong  - as in the  right-hand  half of  Figure  I  --  help  connect  people  with  access  to  different
information,  resources  and  opportunities.  In addition,  as  people  get  to  know  others  who  are
different  from themselves,  there  is less likelihood  that  social  differences  will grow  into divisive
social cleavages.
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14On the other hand, the social fabric of a country may consist of primary social groups
with  few  inter-connections  between  groups,  or  consist  of  groups  with  inherent  power
asymmetries such as the caste system in India - as in the left-hand half of Figure  1.  These
societies are likely to be characterized  by social exclusion and polarization at the best, and at the
worst by corruption, violence and economic stagnation, where the majority copes by depending
on informal social mechanisms for livelihoods, security and insurance.
FUNCTIONING  OF THE STATE
The state consists of a geographically  defined community  and a government comprised of
formal institutions that embody political authority.  The functioning of government institutions
can  be  described in  various  ways, but  most  authors focus  on  two  aspects that  determine
government performance. First is the overall governance environment which fosters the rule of
law, citizen rights and freedom to associate, since these create the societal norms which influence
the emergence, and subsequent performance, of a range of societal institutions. 14 The second
aspect is the competence, authority, resources and accountability of government organizations
working within the overall governance environment" 5
The vertical axis in the framework depicted in  Figure  1 indicates the  level of  state
functioning.  In the top half are states which function effectively, maintain order, collect taxes,
and so on, while in the bottom half are states where institutions are ineffective, or at the extreme
which have collapsed altogether.
COMPLEMENTARITY  AND SUBSTITUTION
The framework is especially helpful in capturing some of the dynamic aspects of the
relationship between social capital and the formal institutions of the state.  Social capital has an
impact on the overall governance environment  and the efficacy of government institutions. Under
conditions of good governance, the functioning state complements the functions of the informal
social groups.  In societies in which primary social groups are connected through cross-cutting
i4  See for example Isham et al (1997), Rodrik (1997), Evans (1996), and Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998).
See for example  Stern and Stiglitz  (1997), Manor (1991), and Knack and Keefer (1995).
15ties,  economic  prosperity  and social  order are likely.  But when  a society's  social  capital  inheres
mainly  in  primary  social  groups  that  are  disconnected  from  one  another,  the  more  powerful
groups  dominate  the  governance  structures,  to the exclusion  of other  groups.  Such  societies  are
characterized  by  latent  conflict.  As  governance  deteriorates,  and  government  efficacy
deteriorates,  the  informal  social  groups  become  substitutes  for  the  state.  People  struggle  to
survive  in a context  of violence,  crime  and war in societies  with  isolated social  groups,  or try to
cope  in an economically  stagnant  situation  to  earn  a  livelihood.  The  following  paragraphs  use
Figure  I to explore this broad dynamic further.
The two  critical  dimensions  along  which  countries  (or  regions  or  communities  within  a
country)  vary are in the level of functioning  of the state and the extent of cross-cutting  ties among
social  groups.  In the ideal scenario  (Quadrant  1, labeled  Well-being),  good governance  and  high
levels of government  functioning  complemented  by high levels of cross-cutting  ties among  social
groups  lead to positive economic  and social outcomes.  Countries  that belong in this quadrant  will
include the Scandinavian  countries and the Netherlands.  All are characterized  by high  economic
development,  social cohesion,  and the relative absence  of crime, violence,  conflict and exclusion.
In Quadrant  2 (labeled  Exclusion)  are found countries  (or regions  or communities)  with
well  functioning  governments  that  have  been  taken  over  or unduly  influenced  by the  dominant
primary  social  groups.  They  are characterized  by relatively  few cross-cutting  ties  across  social
groups,  leading to exclusion of the non-dominant  groups.  The chief  characteristic  of Quadrant  2
is latent conflict.  Countries  in this  quadrant  might  include  South  Africa  under  apartheid,  Latin
American  countries  with  large  indigenous  populations  such  as  Peru  and  Mexico,  some  well
performing  Indian  states  which  exclude  lower  caste  and  tribal  groups,  the  USA  with  high
exclusion  of minority  groups,  Germany  and many  of the countries  in Eastern  Europe.  Excluded
groups  may eventually  organize  across communities,  leading to social  movements  that challenge
the status quo and the power of the state.  If these societies  open up to the excluded  and explicitly
build bridges across social groups, they may prosper  and eventually  move into Quadrant  1.
Alternatively,  they  may  degenerate  into  Quadrant  3  (labeled  Conflict),  becoming
embroiled  in prolonged  conflict,  violence,  civil war  or anarchy  with  gradual  dissolution  of the
functioning  state.  As the  state ceases to  fulfil  its functions,  the  primary  social  groups  become
informal  substitutes  for the state, and power and authority are taken  over by 'warlords',  the mafia,
guerrilla movements  and other groups which use guns, violence and coercion.
16When  societies  are characterized  by  social  groups  with  abundant  cross-cutting  ties  and
poorly  functioning  governments,  as  in  Quadrant  4  (labeled  Coping),  the  informal  networks
become  substitutes  for  the failed  state and  form the  basis  for coping  strategies.  These  include
informal  credit,  informal  contractual  arrangements,  increased  informal  activities  and  self-
employment,  barter  and  "gray"  economies,  community-run  basic  schools  and  health  clinics,  and
so  on.  In Kenya,  a  participatory  poverty  assessment  in six districts  documented  approximately
30,000  self-help  groups  in rural  areas,  with  no  or  little contact  with  any  government  agencies
(Narayan  and Nyamwaya,  1996).  In Russia, Richard  Rose  (1995) has documented  the  informal
coping  networks that emerged  with the collapse  of the communist  state.  With  increasing c6nflict
and  lawlessness, Russia may be moving into Quadrant  3.
The current development  paradigm  focuses  exclusively  on reforming  the  state or markets
to  help  countries  prosper,  and  has  had  mixed  success  at  best.  The framework  outlined  above
suggests  that  interventions  aimed  at  economic  prosperity  need  to take  into account  underlying
social  organization,  and actively  facilitate  cross-cutting  social  interactions  of previously  isolated
and  even  warring  groups.  This  does  not  mean  government  mandating  heterogeneity  of
membership  in formal  groups  and  associations.  But  it does  mean  creating  economic,  political,
institutional  and  social  incentives to  help  build physical  and  social  space  in which  cross-cutting
linkages among people from different  social groups can begin to emerge.
Table  I  lists a number  of important  factors that contribute  to well being  and the relevant
informal  and  formal  institutions.  It  also  underlines  the  relationships  of  substitution  and
complemnentarity between  institutions.  In the  ideal, complementary  relationship,  there  will  be
close  collaboration  between  informal  and  formal  institutions.  Conversely,  when  the
corresponding  institutions  are far apart, substitution  will predominate.  Suppose,  for example,  that
Trust were the contributing  factor in question.  In the best of circumstances,  informal  institutions
regulate  trust  through  social  mechanisms,  rewarding  trustworthy  behavior  and  applying  social
sanctions  such  as  ostracism  and  shame  to  those  who  violate  the  norms.  Formal  institutions
strengthen  the  overall  environment  of trust through  equitable  access to justice,  the  rule of  law,
enforceable  contracts, and a police force that protects citizens.  Values of trust and mutual  respect
can  also  be  reinforced  through  appropriate  school  curricula.  When  the  formal  system  fails,
vigilante groups  or gangs accountable to no one may emerge.
In addition,  the Table  reminds us that not all forms of traditional  social capital are benign,
and that some state actions are required to negate the effects of exclusionary  or conflictual  forms
17of social capital.  For example,  gender differentials  in feeding  and taking care of sick children  are
widely  biased  against  girls.  Public  policy  interventions  that  increase  the  status  of  girls,  for
instance  through  scholarship  programs,  could over time change  local norms about the  respective
value of boy and girl children.
18Table  1.  Role of Formal  and Informal  Institutions  in Promoting  Well  Being
Contributing  Informal Institutions  Formal Institutions
Factors
1. Information:  Families,  friends, peers,  . Newspapers,  trade journals, magazines, books,
*  Markets, prices,  neighbors, kin, ethnic networks,  radios, television, internet, freedom of press,
product  informal  groups, work related  information  disclosure  laws; regulations
innovations  networks; festivals, rituals,  *  Provision of infrastructure;  roads, post offices,
*  Values, opinions,  sports events, story telling,  electricity,  telephones
beliefs  religious  activities,  civil society  *  Schools,  school curriculum
. Political leaders,  groups  *  Political  competition, citizenship  rights, freedom
state  to associate,  independent  audits, civil society
performance  participation  and other accountability
mechanisms
2. Trust  Norms, values, interpersonal  *  Rule of law, independent  judiciary, equity before
relations,  social sanctions  law, enforceable human, consumer and property
rights and contracts  at low personal and financial
cost;
*  Secure financial institutions
*  Schools, school curriculum,  educational
institutions,  values education
. Citizen participation  in state activities and
accountability  mechanisms
3. Managing Risk:  Differential health care  . Health insurance policies; subsidized healthcare
Health  spending, and selective  feeding  for the poor in clinics and hospitals; education;
to optimize  chances of survival  positive investment in girls
of the 'breadwinners';
Home-based  care  . Investment  in human capability; stimulating
Livelihood  Within  family diversification;  livelihood  opportunities;  unemployment
kin or social group network;  insurance,  social security,  safety net schemes;
inter-generational  transfer; work  pensions;  laws enforced for open and fair hiring
related networks,  civil society  based on merit; investment incentives  for private
groups  sector
4. Credit  Ethnic groups, kin networks,  *  Banks, credit rating bureaus,  training and
friends, money lender, revolving  marketing
credit societies, civil society
groups
5. Local public  Community  groups and  *  Co-production  with local groups through direct
goods, basic services  committees  or indirect  representation
and common
property  resources
6. Child care and  Families,  neighbors, friends,  . Day care, nursery schools, schools, school based
socialization  religious institutions  clubs, media; parent education, counseling
7. Dispute  Family, extended kin, ethnic  . Lawyers,  courts, tribunals, dispute resolution
management  and  network, traditional council,  bodies, small court claims, mediation centers,
resolution  church, community groups  police, social worker, alternative dispute
resolution  mechanisms
8. Security  Norms, self-policing,  . Police, armed forces, security  personnel, laws
neighborhood  or social group  about carrying arms by citizens, law enforcement
based security systems  and fairness in law enforcement,  zoning laws,
investment incentives  to private sector
19SECTION  4: THE EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE
As traditional  growth  models  have  failed  to explain  satisfactorily  differences  in growth
rates  between  countries,  researchers  have  increasingly  turned  to  non-economic  variables  for
explanations.  However,  this  extension  of  interest  to  social  characteristics  has  been  limited  by
extremely  weak  data  sets.  Fedderke  and  Klitgaard  (1998),  for  instance,  use  a  series  of  social
outcome  measures  such as divorce and rape rates that are beset with underreporting  problems.  In
addition,  divorce  rates are a  reflection  of both  culture  and  laws,  and  are not necessarily  a good
proxy  for judging  marital  discord.  Despite  data  problems,  the  pattern  of findings  that  emerge
from the recent  literature supports  the picture  emerging  from the four quadrants  of Figure  1, and
the  underlying  relationships  posited  between  associationalism,  government  performance  and
economic  and social outcomes.
Quadrant 1 - Well-Being: Well-Functioning Government, Abundant Cross-Cutting Ties
Several  authors examine the relationship  between economic  development  of nation  states,
government  quality  and  social  capital.  Given  the  limited  quality  of  existing  social  capital
measures,  all  authors  use  proxy  indicators.  Fedderke  and  Klitgaard  (1998)  examined  the
relationship  between  the level of per capita GDP in  1960 and  1985 as well  as the average  growth
of per  capita  GDP  and  an exhaustive  list  of political  and  social  institutional  indicators.  They
found  that  higher  levels  of GDP  were  associated  with  greater  civil  and  political  rights.  This
included  protection  of human  rights,  tolerance  for  diversity  and  compromise  in conflict.  They
also found that higher levels of GDP were associated with lower  levels of political  instability  and
higher levels of efficiency  in public  institutions, as measured  by the efficiency  of the judiciary  and
civil  service  bureaucracy  and  lower  corruption.  Within  these  three  clusters,  various  measures
were  highly correlated.  The relationship  was stronger  for  levels than for  growth rates.  Of some
interest  is that  the  authors  found  a  negative  correlation,  albeit  not  particularly  strong  (-.36),
between  ethno-linguistic  fragmentation  and growth.  A one-standard  deviation  increase  in ethno-
linguistic  fragmentation  (equivalent  to  ranking  Korea,  the  most  homogenous  country  in  the
sample,  next  to Mexico  or Panama)  would  result  in a .7 percent  decrease  in the  average  annual
growth rate.  However, the cluster of political,  social and  institutional  efficiency  measures  are all
positively  associated with GDP levels.
20Making  creative  use  of the Adelman-Taft  (AM)  index  of socio-economic  development,
Temple  and  Johnson  (1998)  demonstrate  that social  capability  measured  in the  1960s predicted
more  accurately  than  conventional  indicators  which  countries  would  grow  in the  1980s.  They
conclude  that  over a period of 25 years,  a one standard deviation  increase  in this variable  would
raise  the annual  growth rate  by  1.8 percentage  points.  As an  illustrative  example,  if India  had
achieved the  same level of social development  on this  measure as South Korea  by  1960, then  its
income  per capita  would  have  grown  at just  about  three  percent  a  year  instead  of  1.3 percent.
India's  income per capita in 1985 would then have been almost 60 percent higher.
These  findings  have  been  criticized  because  the  AM  index  included  some  economic
indicators  rather than  pure  social indicators.  For further  analysis,  Temple  and  Johnson  use  four
social  indicators, to capture underlying  social arrangements.  They are: kinship (dominance  of the
immediate  family  over  the  extended  family  or  clan  and  tribal  allegiances);  modernization  of
outlook  (which  included  an  assessment  of  social  and  political  participation  through  voluntary
associations  and  also the  support  for political  and  economic  modernization);  the extent  of mass
communications  (newspaper  circulation  and number of radios per head); and the importance  of an
indigenous  middle  class (proportion of men employed  in the professions  in contrast  to number of
expatriates  in these professions).  They run regressions using these four components.
All the social variables  except  outlook have statistically  significant  relations  with growth.
The relationship  between mass communications  and  growth remains  robust  even after controlling
for  a  range  of  human  capital,  trade  policy,  political  stability  and  ethnic  fragmentation.  The
authors  conclude  by suggesting  that the extent  of mass  communication  maybe a good  proxy  for
the strength of civic communities,  as reflected in trust and membership  of associations.
Temple  and  Johnson (1998) also  examine the relationship  between  measures  of trust  and
associational  activity  as  measured  in  the  World  Values  Survey  and  their  social  indicators.
Although  the overlap  in countries  from the two  data sets was only  10, the results  are suggestive.
They find negative or insignificant  relations  between the two sets of social measures  except when
they  divide  up the  associational  activity  measure  into groups  that  are  likely to  be distributional
coalitions  (negative  correlation)  and groups that are Putnamesque  (positive correlation).
La  Porta  and  colleagues  (1997)  once  again  used the  trust  data  from  the  World  Values
Survey to examine  the thesis that trust  or social capital  determines  the performance  of society's
institutions  through  cross-country  regressions.  Trust is the propensity  to co-operate.  They argue
that  trust  is  needed  more  to  support  co-operation  between  strangers  or  between  those  who
21encounter  each other  infrequently,  as in large  organizations  not involved  in co-production.  One
such large  organization  is the government,  in which  bureaucrats  have to co-operate  with  a large
number of other bureaucrats  and citizens whom they may never see again to deliver  public goods.
This  argument  holds  equally  true  for  the  performance  of  large  firms  who  must  trust  their
employees  (Fukuyama,  1995).
La Porta et al (1997) find the effects of trust on government  performance  (as measured  by
efficiency  of  the  judiciary,  corruption,  bureaucratic  quality,  tax  compliance  and  civic
participation)  to  be both  statistically  significant  and  quantitatively  large.  In  addition  they  test
Fukuyama's  thesis that family  loyalty is detrimental to the growth of large corporations,  and that
trust  beyond the  family has to become the basis  for co-operation  for this transition  to occur.  La
Porta  et al find  a positive  coefficient  between  the  relative  share  of the top 20  firms  and  trust  in
people, 0.654  (t=4.1), and a negative coefficient  with trust  in family, -.563 (t=-3.1).  This appears
to  confirm  Fukuyama's  thesis  that  for  the  development  of  large  corporations,  trust  has  to
transcend  the primary group of the family.  The authors also found a small but significant  effect  of
trust on infrastructure quality and adequacy, infant mortality and on educational  achievement.
Expanding  Putnam's  (1993)  argument  that  the  Roman  Catholic  church  lowers  trust  in
society  by  imposing  a  hierarchical  structure  on  society,  La  Porta  et  al  include  two  other
hierarchical  religions,  the  Eastern  Orthodox  church  and  Islam.  They  find  a  strong  negative
correlation  between  hierarchical  religions  and trust (-0.61).  Holding  per capita  income  constant,
they  find that countries  with  more dominant  hierarchical  religions  have  less efficient judiciaries,
greater  corruption,  lower  quality  bureaucracies,  higher  rates  of  tax  evasion,  lower  rates  of
participation  in  civic  activities,  lower  importance  of  large  firms  in  the  economy,  inferior
infrastructure  and  higher  inflation.  The results  remain  unchanged  when  hierarchical  religion  is
used as an  instrument  for trust.  Developed  industrialized  countries  are over-represented  in the
sample.
Finally,  Knack  and  Keefer  (1997),  also  using  the  same  World  Values  Data  set from  29
market  economies,  conclude  that  trust  and  civic  co-operation  are  associated  with  stronger
economic  performance.  However,  associational  activity  is  not  correlated  with  economic
performance,  contrary  to Putnam's  findings about Italy.  They  speculate  that  any positive  effects
of groups  may  be balanced  by the  damage  done  by distributional  coalitions  - the  Olson  (1982)
thesis.  This  speculation  is  not  borne  out  by  their  analysis,  however,  since  the  measure  of
associations  is weak  and  does not  include  intensity  of participation  in  groups  or the  nature  of
22groups.  They also conclude that trust and civic co-operation  are stronger  in countries  with formal
institutions  that  effectively  protect  property  and  contract  rights,  and  in  countries  that  are  less
polarized  along  lines of class and ethnicity.  It is important to note that  ethnic  diversity  does not
necessarily  mean  polarization.'6 The "ethnic  polarization"  measure  the  authors  use, the  percent
belonging  to the  largest ethnic  group, is different  from the ethno-linguistic  fractionation  measure
used by  Easterly  and Levine  (1995) in their study  of the tragedy  of growth  in Africa.  The latter
measure  the probability that two randomly selected persons  from a given country will not belong
to the same ethno-linguistic  group.
Quadrant 2 - Exclusion: Well-Functioning Government, Poor Cross-Cutting Ties
This section examines  the relationship  between income inequality, which  in the absence  of
more  direct  measures  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  exclusion;  growth,  inequality  and  government
performance;  and ethnic heterogeneity,  growth and government  performance.  Despite  limitations
of proxy  indicators for  social capital, the patterns of results which  emerge point to the importance
of  cross-cutting  ties  across  social  groups  for  engendering  co-operation,  trust  and  social  and
economic  well-being  and better government performance.
Dani Rodrik  broke new ground in a 1997 paper,  Where Did All  the Growth  Go? External
Shocks,  Social  Conflict and Growth Collapses.  In it, he examines  the interactions  between  social
conflict  and external  shocks on the one hand, and the domestic  conflict-mediating  institutions  on
the other to explain the persistence  of growth and the magnitude  of growth collapses  in the  1970s.
Rodrik argues that when social divisions  run deep and the institutions  of conflict management  are
weak,  exogenous  shocks trigger  distributional  conflicts.  Such  conflicts  diminish the productivity
with which  a society's  resources  are utilized  and divert activities  from the entrepreneurial  sphere
to  the  political  sphere.  Using  econometric  evidence,  he  concludes  that  the  countries  that
experienced  the sharpest  drops  in growth after 1975 were those with  socially divided  societies  as
measured  by indicators  of income inequality,  ethnic  and linguistic  fragmentation  and/or conflict
and social trust).  These countries  also had weak institutions  of conflict  management  measured  by
the  quality  of  governmental  institutions,  honest  and  non-corrupt  bureaucracy,  rule  of  law,
democratic  rights and  institutionalized  modes of social safety nets.
16 Rather than using the more neutral term of ethnic heterogeneity or diversity, most  authors use more loaded
terms such as fracturation or fragmentation.
23Rodrik  found  that  ethno-linguistic  fragmentation  was  not  strongly  linked  to  income
inequality  (r=0.13), but remained  significant even after controlling  for institutional  quality.  Hence
the evidence  suggests that  ethnic cleavages  matter  in the ability to manage shocks  even after the
quality  of  institutions  is  controlled  for.  To  test  the  robustness  of  this  conclusion,  he  uses
additional  measure  of  social  divisions,  such  as home  language,  the  proportion  of people  who
speak the country's  official language  at home, racial tension, lack of trust, and the Gini coefficient
for  land.  The relation  between  these  social  conflict  proxy  measures  and the  growth  differential
between  1960-75  and  1975-89  was  negative  and  significant.  The  correlations  between  the
measures  varied, thus each measure  is capturing  a different  social characteristic.  For example,  he
found that "no trust"  is highly correlated with income inequality,  but not with ethnic and linguistic
measures.
Fedderke  and  Klitgaard  (1998) found  significant  correlations  between  income  inequality,
degree  of  hierarchical  steepness  in  society  and  degree  of  individualism  (Hofstede  cultural
variables)  and  levels  of  per  capital  GDP,  but  not  with  growth.  Knack  and  Keefer  (1997)
demonstrate  that the Gini coefficient  for income inequality  is strongly associated  with lower  trust
and civic co-operation.  They also demonstrate  that limits on executive power increase trust.
When  income  inequality  is considered  a proxy  (albeit  imperfect)  of social  cleavages  and
social  exclusion,  two  findings  are  worth  noting.  First  is  the  fact  that  measures  of  income
inequality  are quite  stable, even  during periods of rapid  growth.  A  possible interpretation  is that
since the dominant  social  groups  make  policy  and resource  allocation  decisions,  these  decisions
reinforce  their  power  and  prosperity,  and  hence  policy  interventions  do  not  result  in  major
changes  for  those excluded.  The second  consistent  finding  is that  countries  with  initial  unequal
income distributions  experience  slower growth.  This finding  is even  stronger  for initial  unequal
distribution  of  land  in  developing  countries  (Deininger  and  Squire,  1997). Birdsall  and  Sabot
(1994)  come  to  similar  conclusions  in  comparing  high  inequality  and  low  growth  in  Latin
America  and  low  inequality  and  high  growth  in East  Asia,  but they  turn  to  political  economy
considerations  to  explain  the  different  strategies  in  the  two  regions.  In  Latin  America,  the
political elite has little incentive to invest in the well-being  of the poor, but in East Asia the threat
of communist  insurgency  led to government  investment  in the rural poor,  in education  and health
and  in  rural  infrastructure.  Larrain  and  Vergara  (1997),  using  data  for  45  developed  and
developing  countries,  conclude  that  distributive  inequalities  give  rise  to  social  pressures  and
conflict,  and these  in turn generate greater  instability  in economic  policies  and lower  investment.
Rodrik  (1997)  also  concludes  on  the  basis  of  cross-country  regressions  that  severe  income
24inequality  is a threat  to political and economic  stability.  When  people see some living  in luxury
while  others  are impoverished,  it creates  social unrest  that typically  culminates  in the overthrow
of government,  disruption  of the local economy and collapse  of foreign  investor confidence.
Negative  associations  between  the  ethnic  diversity  of  societies  and  growth  have  been
reported  by authors  such as Easterly  and Levine  (1995) and Mauro  (1995).  Collier  and Gunning
(1997) demonstrate  that ethnic fractionalization  negatively  affects policy and reduces productivity
more  directly.  They  also  show that  the  correlations  are  stronger  with  the  delivery  of  public
services  such as schools  and telephones,  and weaker for macroeconomic  policy.  The wide use of
the  ethno-linguistic  fragmentation  indicator  has  created  a  mindset  in  which  equates  ethnic
diversity  with  economic  and  political  disaster,  particularly  in  Africa.  In an  important  study,
Collier  and  Hoeffler  (1998)  establish  that  the  relationship  between  civil  war  and  ethnic
fractionalization  is not linear.  The most  unstable societies  are those  in which  the index is around
45-50,  societies  with  two  fairly  equal  ethnic  groups.  On  the  other  hand,  highly  fractionalized
societies,  such as are found  in many countries  in Africa (average  score of 67.6),  are as stable  as
the most homogenous  societies.
In  Latin  America,  by  contrast,  if  one  groups  all  the  non-Spanish  indigenous  people
together  and all the Spanish speakers together,  many Latin American  countries then consist  of two
large  groups  with little  interaction  across groups,  a situation  rife with latent  conflict.  A recently
completed  poverty  study  in  Peru  found  that  the  overall  poverty  levels  had  declined  in  Peru.
However,  the  non-Spanish  speaking  population  had  not  been  integrated  politically,  socially  or
economically.  In fact  it had  fallen  further  behind  in  income  terms  even  after  controlling  for
education,  location, access to services, land and or house ownership  (Hentschel  et al, 1998).
To  complement  findings  from  cross-country  data,  and  to  understand  the  importance  of
cross-cutting  ties in reducing  exclusion  even  in multi-racial,  multiethnic  industrialized  countries,
it  is  useful  to  examine  within-country  data.  Sustainable  economic  development  requires
reciprocal  on-going  relationships  and  networks  beyond  narrow  geographic,  ethnic  or  political
communities  in order to ensure access to additional  resources (Portes and Sensebrenner,  1993).
Verba  et  al  (1996)  in  Voice  and  Equality:  Civic  Voluntarism  and  American  Politics
address the issue of inequality  and the decline  in civic engagement  in the last three decades  in the
United  States.  They  demonstrate  that politicians  listen  primarily  to those with college  education
and  those  who  make  contributions  to  political  campaigns,  which  leads  to  selective  hearing  of
interests  of  those  who  are  educated,  wealthy  and  organized.  Their  findings  are  based  on  a
25nationally  representative  sample of 15,000 Americans.  They argue that citizen participation  is the
heart  of  a  functioning  democracy  in which  politicians  respond  to  citizen  concerns,  interests,
preferences  and needs.  This presumes  that the voice of citizens  is clear, understood,  and  loud so
policymakers  have an incentive to pay attention to what  is being said.  In the US,  as dollars  have
substituted  for time as inputs into the political campaigns,  Verba  et al show how participation  in
the  political  process  becomes  skewed  to  the  wealthy  and  is  responsive  to  their  priorities  and
concerns.  "When  money  replaces  time  as the  principle  form  of political  currency,  the  playing
field  is no  longer level"  (1997, p.21).  The voice  of the poor  gets  drowned  out,  which  leads  to
their greater exclusion.  The figures show that the top 3 percent of the sample with family incomes
over  $125,000  produce  more than their proportionate  share of the vote, protests,  campaign  hours
and  35 percent of the money  contributed.  The top two income groups, with annual  incomes  over
$75,000  account  for  more  than  half  the  money  contributed  to  political  campaigns,  while  the
bottom  20  percent of the  income  distribution,  with  incomes  less  than  $15,000  produce  only  14
percent  of the vote and 2 percent of the campaign dollars.
These distinctions  are important  because there  is limited overlap  of concerns  and interests
between  these two groups.  The disadvantaged,  roughly one-sixth  of the public with no education
beyond  high  school,  are  more  than  twice  as  likely,  and  those  receiving  means-tested  welfare
benefits are four times  as likely, to focus on basic human needs, poverty, jobs, housing  and health.
The concerns  of the  more advantaged  are  linked to economic  issues,  such as taxes,  government
spending,  budget,  and  social/moral  issues,  such  as  abortion  or  pornography.  In  sum,  public
officials  hear  many  more messages  from the advantaged  than  from the poor because  the  former
belong to many more organizations  that mobilize voice  and resources.  The authors conclude  that
the  only way to have the voices  of the poor heard is through creating  organizations  of the  poor.
These  organizations  can  be  political  or  non-political  or  religious.  Working  within  these
organizations,  the disadvantaged  can learn new civic skills and networking that provides  the basis
for the  emergence  of social  and  political  movements.  The  civil  rights  movement  is a  case  in
point.
Although  the  norms  about  racial  equality  have  changed  in the  US since the  civil  rights
movement,  exclusion  based  on race is still common,  subtle in the higher echelons  of society and
more  blatant  against those who  live in low income areas.  The disadvantaged  may  be excluded
not because  of active  discrimination,  but because  of non-overlapping  social  networks.  What  is
striking  about US society is the lack of interconnectedness  in social and civic life between  whites
and  blacks.  Varshney  (1998)  argues  that  the  different  degrees  of  civic  connectedness  among
26blacks and whites explain why race riots in the 1960s occurred  in many northern cities and in Los
Angeles,  but not in southern  cities.  Studies showed  that  income inequalities  between  black  and
white  Americans  explained  neither the timing  nor the location of riots (Horowitz,  1983).  Rather
the  explanation  appears  to lie in degree  of contact  and  integration  of black Americans  into  local
life, in this case  local government  structures  (Liberson  and  Silvernan,  1965).  This lack of over-
lapping social networks has many negative consequences  for those excluded.
Friedman  and Krackhardt  (1997) come to similar  conclusions  in a very  different  context.
They  conclude  that Asian Chinese  and Asian  Indians do not rise to high and influential  positions
in the  US computer  industry,  despite high  educational  achievements,  because  they  are  excluded
from the  social  networks  of the dominant  group,  in this  case  European Americans.  The authors
use network  analysis  to study five workgroups  in the computer  industry in the  U.S.  Similarly,  a
recent  study  in the United  Kingdom by  Gordon and  Swift (1993) examines  whether  social status
and occupational  attainment  are based on merit or on the social  status of one's  family.  They  find
that, after controlling  for education,  an individual whose parents are in high service occupations  is
more  likely  to  be  in  a  high  service  occupation  than  an  individual  from  a  working  class
background.  They  conclude  that occupation  is not determined  solely or even primarily  by merit,
but is determined  to a large extent by one's  parents'  social class or occupational  background.
The  exclusion  of  large  numbers  of  people  from  participation  in  the  benefits  of
development,  in a  governance  environment  of some degree  of law  and  order  and  protection  of
basic  human  rights,  creates  an environment  of political  opportunity,  contentious  politics  and  the
emergence  of social movements  linked to institutional  politics.  Three  political scientists  stand out
in the field of social movements,  namely Charles Tilly (1978); Theda Skocpol (1979); and Sidney
Tarrow  (1998).  Tarrow uses two terms to frame a broad theory of social movements:  contentious
politics,  and  political  opportunity  structure.  Contentious  politics  occur  when  ordinary  people,
often  in league with more  influential citizens, join  forces  in confrontation  with elites,  authorities
and  opponents.  Contentious  politics  are  triggered  when  changing  political  opportunities  and
constraints  create  incentives  for  social  actors  who  lack  resources  on  their  own.  When  their
contention  is backed  by  dense  social  networks  and  galvanized  by  culturally  resonant  symbols,
contentious  politics  lead to sustained  interaction  with opponents.  The result is a social movement.
Tarrow  (1998)  defines  a  social  movement  as  collective  challenges,  based  on  common
purpose  and  social  solidarities,  in  sustained  interaction  with  elites,  opponents,  and  authorities.
Unlike  corporate  interest  groups  or  political  parties,  social  movements  especially  in the  early
27stages  lack  money,  organization  and  access  to  the  state,  and  hence  depend  on  the  collective
challenge  to  gain  attention  and  create  constituencies.  While  it  is  commonly  accepted  that
collective  action  is based on shared purpose  or interest, social movements  also tap deeper feelings
of solidarity  or  identity, that which  gives shared  meaning.  Social  movements  persist  when  they
are  embedded  in  dense  interlocking  social  networks.  It  is  only  when  there  is  "connective
structure"  between  members  of  groups  that  the  action  of  one  can  incite  another.  Social
movements  have to go beyond isolated incidents  before they become a movement  that persists  in
time and space.
While  most collective  action  is based on  physical  proximity  and  face to face interaction,
the advent of the press resulting  in newspapers  and pamphlets  (Chartier,  1991) and more recently
of the  internet,  created  the  possibility  of connecting  people  in different  places  in a  movement
(Castells,  1997).  Most  importantly,  newspaper  readership  helped  link  people  across  class
boundaries  and  resulted  in  powerful  national  movements,  such  as  the  abolition  of  slavery  in
Britain, the French revolution  and American  independence.  "The  loose ties created  by print  and
association,  by newspapers,  pamphlets  and  informal  social  networks,  made  possible  a degree  of
coordinated  collective  action across groups  and classes that the  supposedly  'strong  ties'  of social
class seldom  accomplished"  (Tarrow,  1998, page  51).  Hence the strengthening  of social  capital
among  groups and across groups, and shifts in societal power structure,  are a complex  function  of
politics, political opportunity  structures and access to communications  technology.
Using  Tarrow's  concepts  of contentious  politics  and  political  opportunity,  Fox  (1996)
shows  how  some  indigenous  groups  can  successfully  organize  to  challenge  the  power  of  a
repressive  state.  Mexico  has  the  largest  population  of  indigenous  groups  in Latin  America,  a
population  of  10  million,  comprising  56  officially  recognized  ethno-linguistic  groups.  Fox
demonstrates  that  indigenous  communities  are high  in  social  solidarity  and  horizontal  decision
making,  i.e. high  in social  capital,  but still among  the  poorest  in Mexico.  He  shows  that  these
communities  of  scattered  population  can  be  successful  when  they  network  with  other
geographically  spread  out communities,  find  allies  in political  elites,  or are  supported  by  other
non-political  elites,  such as the  Catholic  church.  Only  then  do they  have  sufficient  bargaining
power  to  successfully  challenge  local  power  structures,  overcome  the  repression  imposed  by
authoritarian  regimes, and access the power and resources  of the state to meet their basic needs.
If national  policies  become  inclusive,  and  co-production  with  the  state  or  other  allies
becomes  commonplace,  countries  (or  regions within countries)  can move  into the  first quadrant.
28Heller  (1996)  argues  that  underlying  Kerala's  development  transformation  in  recent  years  has
been  a  transformation  of primary  caste  and  community  ties  and  identity  to  more  universalistic
principles and  identity, achieved by political party activists.  He notes that "the natural outcome  of
a vigorous  civil society rooted in interests bounded  by parochial  loyalties is not development,  but
a kind of demand overload."  In recent years, strategic  use of the internet and the global media  has
also facilitated  social  movements  which  successfully  challenged  the  power of exclusionary  states
in countries  characterized  with  limited protection  by the  law or law and order  agencies.  This  is
true for  the Philippines,  for the  indigenous  movements  in Chiapas,  Mexico  (Castells,  1997)  and
more recently in Indonesia.
Quadrant 3 - Conflict: Dysfunctional or Collapsed State, Limited Cross-Cutting Ties
Income  inequality,  isolated primary  groups  and a governance  structure  which  is co-opted
by a few, unaccountable  to the majority,  can lead to violence,  conflict  and  high  levels  of crime.
The  effective  power  of the  state  can  be taken  over  by those  who  exercise  the  most  force  and
coercion,  and  in effect  run  parallel  economies  and  substitute  governance  structures.  When  the
state authority,  law and order extend irregularly  across territory  and functional  relations  (including
class,  ethnic  and  gender  relations),  power  centers  shift  away  from  the  state  to  extra-legal
authorities  that  co-exist with the state but remain  autonomous  of it.  In many countries  emerging
from  war,  the  authority  of the  state  remains  limited  to  the  center,  with  loss  of  control  and
legitimacy  over the  periphery.  Power gets usurped  from a weak  state and  used for personal  rule
and  control.  The impunity  of drug trade,  unlawful treatment  of the  poor by the  police  or local
mafia,  high  crime  rates,  rich communities  behind  high  security  fences  are  all  examples  of the
crisis of the state.
Haiti provides ample evidence of the degeneration  into violence  and civil war when  social
cleavages  deepen,  and  formal  institutions  become  instruments  for  control  and private  riches  for
one social  group while others  live in poverty and  personal insecurity.  White and  Smucker (1998)
trace today's  social  cleavages  and failure  of the state to the colonial  days.  In 1804, when  Haiti
became  the first nation to gain independence  from a European  colonial  power, two  social groups
emerged  with different  interests.  One was a large  number of newly  freed slaves, who  fought  for
personal  freedom  from bondage,  and the other was a small class of freed people  of color  (which
included  the wealthy)  who  fought  for economic  and  political  freedom.  "These  sharply  defined
social  distinctions  where  neither  class  assumed  responsibility  for  providing  the  national  public
29good set the stage for Haiti's  evolution  as an independent  but deeply divided society."  White and
Smucker  describe  social  capital  as "truncated",  rich at  the  local  level but weak  at regional  and
national  levels.  Peasant  social groupings  are  local, stable, autonomous,  self-governed  and  based
on reciprocity.  These  social groups  feel insecure, fear and actively  avoid the state,  and establish
'furtive'  agricultural  units on the margins  of society.  In the  presence  of an oppressive  state and
the  absence  of state  provided  services,  these  informal  social  relations  become  substitutes  and
serve as the primary  social safety nets for the poor.  The Haitian  state, despite  recent  changes,  is
marked  by  political  intolerance,  patronage,  extraction  of wealth  and  lack of  protection  for  the
majority of its citizens.
Mauricio  Rubio  (1997)  shows  how  in  Colombia  the  existence  of  a  large  and  growing
illegal and  underground  economy  run by powerful  criminal  organizations  has resulted  in parallel
institutional  environments  that  reward  and  favor  opportunistic  and  criminal  behaviors.  Rubio
shows how high  levels of social capital within 'criminal'  organizations  are directed  to extra-legal
activities,  rent  seeking  and  high  returns  exclusively  for those  involved  in  such activities.  The
organizations  that run in parallel  with  government  institutions  actually  provide  higher returns  to
those  who  participate  than  a  regular  career  would  offer.  He  estimates  that  between  1980  and
1993,  the  average  remuneration  for  minor  criminal  activities,  excluding  drug  trafficking  and
kidnapping,  tripled  in real terms, while returns for formal work remained  stagnant.  Currently,  the
annual income of a petty criminal  in Colombia is around $20,000  per year,  about  10 times  the per
capita  GDP.  Two  surveys,  National  Survey  of Quality  of  Life, and  Quality  of Life  in  Bogota
provide  some  sobering  statistics.  In  addition  to  the  staggering  statistics  on  homicides  in
Colombia,  54 percent  of the barrios reported  problems  with conflict,  drugs, gangs  or prostitution
(Knaul and Patrinos,  1998).
Based  on  a  study  of  persistent  inter-communal  violence  in  India  in  particular  cities,
Varshney  (I 998)  argues  that  there  is  an  integral  link between  the  structure  of  civic  life  in  a
multiethnic  society  and  ethnic  conflict.  Inter-ethnic  networks  become  agents  of peace  because
they  build  bridges  and  manage  tensions,  but if  communities  are  organized  only  on  intra-ethnic
lines and the interconnections  with other communities  do not exist, ethnic violence  is quite  likely.
He divides  both inter- and  intra-ethnic  networks into associational  forms of engagement  (formal)
and  everyday  forms  of engagement.  Associational  networks  include  professional  organizations,
reading  clubs,  cadre-based  political  parties,  film clubs,  NGOs.  Everyday  forms  of engagement
consist  of  simple,  routine  interactions  such  as  families  visiting  each  other,  children  playing
together, joint  participation  in festivals, or eating together.  He concludes  that while  both forms  of
30social  interaction  are  important,  in  large  cities  associational  forms  are  sturdier  than  everyday
forms  of engagement,  especially  when confronted  with attempts  by politicians  to polarize  people
on ethnic  lines.
Quadrant 4 - Coping: Poorly Functioning State, Abundant Cross-Cutting Ties
Societies  with  higher  levels  of  cross-cutting  ties  rather  than  deep  social  cleavages  and
ineffective  or  co-opted  states  are  characterized  by  the  substitution  of  the  formal  system  by
informal  systems.  If the  state is not totalitarian  or coercive,  societies  may  not disintegrate  into
widespread  crime,  violence  or war, but large segments  of society are left to their own  devices  to
cope  in the best ways they can.
Richard  Rose  (1995)  uses  the term  "hour-glass  society"  to  describe  such  societies,  like
Russia during  the transition.  There  is a rich social  life at the base, consisting  of strong  informal
networks  relying on trust  between friends, relatives and  other face-to-face  groups  and which  may
include  friends  of friends.  At the top of the  hour glass, there  is rich political  and  social  life, as
elites compete  for power,  wealth  and prestige.  There  is co-operation  within and  between  elites
and formal  institutions  as the  elites use the resources  of the state for their own  betterment.  The
narrow  mid-point  of the  hour-glass  insulates  individuals  from  the  influence  of the  state,  and
citizens  can  be described  as "negatively  integrated"  from the  demands  of potentially  oppressive
state.  The state on the other  hand tolerates  small-scale  "rogue"  organizations  as long  as they  do
not interfere with the affairs of the state.
Using data from the New  Russia Barometer,  a nation-wide  survey, Rose  documents  that
only  one  in eight  reported  that  they  earned  enough  from their  official  jobs  to  meet  their  basic
needs.  The majority get by because in addition to the official economy,  they rely on a multiplicity
of unofficial  economies  such as growing  food, exchanging  help and  services with friends,  having
a second job or depending  on tips  and bribes.  There  is a vast disconnect  between the  rich social
mechanisms  and  exchanges  at the  bottom  and  local  formal  institutions.  Three-quarters  of the
people  also  said  that  they  never  participated  in  local  level  formal  institutions.  The  same
proportion  said that most people cannot  be trusted  and that one  had to be careful  in dealing  with
people.  The level of distrust in political parties, parliament,  police, court and civil servants  ranged
from 71  percent to 83 percent.  When asked if they expected  fair treatment,  70 percent responded
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inflationary pressures in Russia results in "100 friends being worth more than ten million rubles."
This hour glass metaphor fits many developing countries, in which formal institutions are
marked by high levels of corruption, and the informal systems of coping become the primary
sources for  safety, insurance and livelihood for the majority.  These networks can  become
overextended, and unless there are strong allies outside the communities the informal groups
remain isolated and economically stagnant.  It is in these environments, when there is political
space  to  organize,  that  civil  society  emerges and  often  begins  to  function as  a  shadow
government, providing services that the state is incapable of providing. Civil society movements
may be crushed by the political regime, or may alternatively become forces for transformation of
the state.  In effect, this means moving from a role of substitution to one of complementarity with
the state.  The case of BRAC (the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) is an example of
the latter. As a Bangladeshi NGO, BRAC provided an extensive network of schools for the poor
without any state involvement, and was initially perceived to be a competitor and threat to the
power of the state. In fact, it was a substitute  for the failure of the state to provide basic education
services to poor children.  Over time, however, the state has become a partner with BRAC in
reaching the poor with these services.
Collier and Gunning (1997) characterize  most African governments  as being run by small
educated elites, who are neithter  accountable nor responsive to the needs of the large majority of
the population, who send the wrong incentive signals and thus discourage private investment, who
spawn high levels of corruption, who draw most of their support from urban areas, and who
suppress civil liberties so as to prevent those excluded from organizing protest. This governance
environment results in poor returns to public investment, poor performance of publicly provided
infrastructure services (roads, railways, electricity, telephones) and  low expenditure on social
security transfers.
Kenya, for example, has a  strong tradition of  self-help, harambee.  Overuse of  this
tradition has left people exhausted and disinclined to participate in any harambee initiated by the
government.  A participatory poverty assessment in Kenya estimated that there are over 30,000
small self-help groups, primarily of the poor.  The activities of these groups range from raising
chickens to helping with school and hospital fees, or revolving credit and savings.  Yet the vast
majority of these groups, especially among the poor, remain isolated solidarity groups caught in
poverty traps. Those groups with membership extending across income groups are able to benefit
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1996).  Despite outbreaks  of state initiated tribal violence  in recent  years, ethnic  tension  was not
mentioned  as a problem by people in any of 30 communities  across the country.
Similarly,  in  neighboring  Tanzania  composed  of  over  300  ethnic  groups,  years  of
socialism  and villagization  programs have led to a strong sense of national identity  which appears
to  supersede  ethnic  identity.  Tanzania,  despite  acute  poverty  and  a  bankrupt  state,  has  not
experienced  ethnic  violence  or polarization.  In a participatory  poverty  assessment  conducted  in
87 communities  across Tanzania, people  explicitly  linked peace  and community  economic  levels
to informal groups with cross-ethnic  membership  (Narayan,  1997).
In a study on entrepreneurship  in Ghana, Barr (1997,  1998) finds that the small,  cohesive
solidarity  networks  of the  Ghanaian  entrepreneurs  seem  to  function  as a  substitute  for  formal
institutions  and markets,  while  the  larger more diverse  networks  of non-Ghanaian  entrepreneurs
provide  better access to information about markets and technologies.
Several  recent  studies  conducted  as part  of the  World  Bank's  Local  Level  Institutions
Study  (Grootaert  and  Narayan,  1999)  confirm  the  importance  of  heterogeneity  in  group
membership  and economic  outcomes.  This pattern of results  is found in rural  Tanzania  (Narayan
and Pritchett,  1997) in Indonesia  (Grootaert,  1998), and in Burkina  Faso  (Grootaert,  Swamy  and
Oh, 1999).
Other  studies,  particularly  from  Latin  America,  show  time  and  again  that  despite  high
ratings  in community  solidarity, indigenous  communities  remain poor with few connections  to the
powerful  within  or  outside  the  community.  While  they  may  manage  to  attract  government
provided basic social infrastructure,  this does not result in production  opportunities.  There is little
evidence that  indigenous  social organizations  are providing  the foundation  for  indigenous groups
to  mobilize  either  for  fundamental  rights  or  for  greater  access  to  economic  and  political
participation  (Junho  Pefia and  Lindo-Fuentes,  1998;  Gacitua-Mario,  1998).  In the  absence  of
outside  allies, indigenous  social capital of poor communities  remains a substitute for the resources
and services that are normally  provided by the state.
All over the developing  world, the poor and the middle  class survive and have  developed
ingenious strategies  to survive.  Self-provision  in water and sanitation  services is still the norm,  as
one  billion  people  remain  without  access to safe  water  and two  billion  people  without  adequate
sanitation.  Informal  child  care  arrangements  in  urban  slums  as  mothers  go  to  work  abound,
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common  property  resources,  informal  credit  mechanisms  and saving  strategies  - all  these  work,
but they trap people in low productivity, and make them risk averse.
limprovements  in  service  delivery  are  possible  within  segments  of  society,  even  when
many  aspects  of the  state  are  dysfunctional.  This  is evidenced  in the  widespread  success  of
demand-oriented  service  delivery,  in which  government  agencies  have  successfully  redesigned
themselves  away  from  delivering  services  to  working  with  local  groups  as  partners  in  "co-
production".  Examples  include  government  provision  of  teachers,  textbooks,  curricula  and
training for community  managed primary  schools  in Baluchistan,  Pakistan.  Elsewhere  in Pakistan
(Orangi  in  Karachi)  as  well  as  in Recife,  Brazil,  governments  are  providing  main  trunk  and
secondary  sewers  in low income urban neighborhoods,  while communities  raise resources  for and
manage  household  connections.  In  West  Bengal,  India, the  government  is providing  technical
know how, and sharing benefits through joint  management  of forests with community  groups.  In
all parts  of the world, there  are government  programs  providing  the capital costs  for rural  water
systems,  relying  on  communities  for  their  local  knowledge,  management,  and  operation  and
maintenance.  In  Taiwan,  Indonesia,  India,  Mexico  and  Turkey  there  are  irrigation  schemes
following  the  same principles.  And there  are micro-credit  programs  for the poor all  over  South
Asia,  Latin  America  and  Africa,  with  groups  monitoring  performance  and  helping  clients  to
graduate  out of the  program to starting  using  local banks.  All these examples  succeed  when  the
overall  rules  of  the  game  are  fair  and  transparent,  and  when  the  needs,  priorities,  skills  and
organizational  capacity  of  local  groups  are  complemented  by  timely  technical,  financial
assistance,  organizational  know-how  provided  by  government  agencies,  civil  society  or  the
private  sector.
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Two sets of policy implications  flow from the foregoing  analysis.  The first set deals with
how countries  (or communities  within countries)  can strengthen  cross-cutting  ties and  governance
to  improve  economic  and  social well  being  (movements  towards  Quadrant  1 in the  framework).
The second set includes practical social policy interventions  that are likely to be helpful.
MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  WELL-BEING
Cohesive  family,  clan  or tribal  groups  lay the  foundation  for  social  and  economic  well-
being,  but  it is only  when  these  groups  develop  ties  (both  weak  and  dense)  with  other  social
groups  that  societies  can  build  cohesive  webs  of  cross-cutting  social  relations  at  all  levels.
Societies  in Western  Europe,  particularly  the  Scandinavian  countries  and  the Netherlands,  have
achieved high  levels of social inclusion, peace  and economic  prosperity, which  would place them
in Quadrant  I of the framework presented  in Figure  1.  In the Netherlands  for example,  adoption
of consociational  forms  of  democracy  has  been  given  credit  for  achieving  the  social  cohesion
necessary  for economic  development  (Lijphart,  1969, 1977).
Power is unequally  distributed in all societies,  but societies  differ markedly  in the degree,
extent  and permanence  of power asymmetries  and social exclusion.  When the networks  of those
excluded  or disempowered,  consist  primarily  of "people  like themselves",  and  are not linked  to
outside  groups,  information,  power, and resources, the networks serve an important  insurance  and
solidarity  function.  However,  they  do  not  become  agents  for  transformation  into  high  return
production  groups  or into powerful  social movements  which challenge the powers  of the state.  In
Latin America,  it is only when indigenous groups become  included  in local governance  structures,
or when  they  form  alliances  with  other  indigenous  groups  in the  country  that  are  they  able  to
claim  attention  and resources of the state.  The same is true for lower caste  groups  in India or for
the  inclusion  of African  Americans  in US society.  Similarly,  successful  strategies  for  service
provision  to  excluded  groups,  such  as micro-credit  schemes,  initially  take  advantage  of  social
solidarity  among  small  groups of the poor to extend credit to those without  formal  collateral.  But
over time, as a deliberate  strategy, they  socialize poor clients  in the methods of formal institutions,
and actively help connect the poor to the formal banking systems.
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Quadrant  2 (Exclusion)  in Figure  1.  To move  towards  economic  and  social  well-being,  states
have to:
*  develop  mechanisms  for  inclusion  of those  previously  excluded  into the  formal  systems  of
finance, education  and governance
*  promote change in values and norms to support  inclusion
*  create economic opportunities
*  encourage  social connectivity  between the excluded  and those in power in different  spheres  of
activity.
Education  and special support in the form of training and mentoring is likely to be needed
during  the transition,  so that previously  excluded  groups  gain the capacity  to  interact  effectively
with  local governance,  educational  and  financial  institutions.  This  has, for example,  been a key
element  of policy  in post-apartheid  South Africa.
When  the  web  of cross-cutting  linkages  across  primary  social  groups  is weak  or  non-
existent,  and  interests  of the excluded  groups  cannot  be channeled  through  formal  institutions  of
the  state,  conflict  and  violence  between  groups  based  on  religion,  caste,  race,  or ethnicity  may
escalate.  Dominant  or militant groups  co-opt the power of the state to their own ends and become
substitutes  for  the  state.  A  militarized  or collapsed  state  characterizes  Quadrant  3  (Conflict)  in
Figure  1.  Because  of the  absence  of cross-cutting  ties,  the  reconstruction  of society  and  state
(movement  from Quadrant  3 to Quadrant  1) must  include participatory  processes  to create  social
cohesion,  reconciliation,  and peace  between  former  enemies; and  reintegration  of former  soldiers
into society.  Particular  attention  needs to be paid to mechanisms  for  power sharing,  consultation,
justice,  governance  and provision  of security for all. Equally important  is equitable  distribution  of
resources  among  former  enemy  groups  for  reconstruction  of infrastructure,  education,  economy
and  governance  across  territories  inhabited  by different  groups.  Mass  media that  portray  mutual
respect,  reconciliation  and  tolerance  among  previously  warring  groups  can  help  provide  the
support  needed to heal wounds and increase the probability  of re-knitting society.
Widespread  economic  stagnation  and  use  of coping  strategies  characterize  Quadrant  4
(Coping)  in Figure  1.  These  are societies  with  dense  cross-cutting  ties,  but when  the  formal
institutions  are  co-opted  by  special  interest  groups,  the  informal  networks  and  connections
between  those  excluded  become overloaded  by the  burden  of trying  to offer services  previously
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association  are  reduced  to  coping  strategies.  Because  of  weak  reciprocal  connections  among
many  different  social  groups,  the  collapse  of  the  state  need  not  degenerate  into  widespread
violence  and  crime.  But  in this  regressive  environment,  the  informal  institutions  become  poor
substitutes  for  formal  institutions,  whether  in provision  of credit,  education,  infrastructure,  legal
protection,  security  or other  basic services.  To make progress  in this environment,  civil  society
must move  beyond the delivery  of services, and take on the role of mobilizing  social  movements
to demand  changes in governance.
POLICY  INTERVENTIONS
To  design the  right policy  intervention,  it is vital to  understand  the nature  of a society's
formal  and  informal  institutions.  Moving  from a relationship  of substitution  to complementarity
between  informal  and  formal  institutions  may  involve  interventions  by  the  state,  the  private
sector,  civil  society  groups,  or all  three.  Interventions  may  be at  the  community  level  or at the
level of national laws, or changes in rules and regulations.  Expansion  of cross-cutting  ties may  be
promoted  through incentive schemes for the private  sector or civil society groups  supported  by the
government,  or directly through improved communication  channels  such as roads, telephones  and
media.  Policies need to be tailored to take into account both the level of functioning  of the state
and the current strength of cross-cutting  ties.
It is important  to note that the role played  by civil society,  and the contribution  it makes,
will differ  in the different  quadrants  of the framework.  In Quadrant  I  (Well-being),  the  key role
for  civil  society  groups  is to keep the  state accountable,  and  support  processes  that  balance  the
power  of various  interest and social groups  in society.  In Quadrant  2 (Exclusion), the key  role is
in facilitating  the organization  and mobilization  of excluded groups,  identifying potential  allies  in
powerful  groups to challenge  the state's  exclusionary  practices.  In Quadrant  3 (Conflict), the key
roles shift to peace mediation,  reconciliation,  and reintegration of previously  warring and possibly
armed  groups  into society.  Finally  in Quadrant  4 (Coping),  in the absence  of an  effective  state,
civil  society groups  have  important  roles  in service delivery,  while  at the  same time  mobilizing
society to demand  better  governance.  This means,  of course, that civil society organizations  will
sometimes  face the need to transform  themselves  (e.g. from service delivery  to advocacy),  a task
fully as difficult  as transforming  society.
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investments  in the organizational  capacity of the poor  are crucial, both at the micro  level in direct
support  of poor people, and at the macro  level through changes  in laws and rules so as to support
associational  activity.  For example,  in Bolivia  the  Law  of Popular  Participation  established  a
framework  for decentralization  with two important components.  One was the devolution  of fiscal
resources  and  authority  to the municipal  level, the  other was assignment  of an oversight  role to
local communities.  The government  recruited NGOs to mobilize  local communities  to fulfil  their
new role.  The NGOs provide training to community groups in how to conduct participatory  needs
assessments,  formulate priorities,  collaborate  across communities,  and monitor  municipal  decision
making  and expenditures  (Faguet,  1998).
Second,  cross-cutting  ties can  be fostered  directly,  through  a variety of mechanisms  that
fall under seven  broad headings:
*  Information
*  Inclusive participation
*  Conflict management  mechanisms
*  Education and values
*  Economic restructuring
*  Governance  and decentralization
*  Demand-driven  service delivery
Information
Whether  one  views  social  capital  through  a  sociological,  political  or economic  lens,  all
perspectives  lead  one  to  the  conclusion  that  a  free  information  flow  is  essential  for  equal
opportunity,  consensus  building,  keeping  the  state  accountable,  and  challenging  the  state  when
necessary.  Making  access to information  about employment  or investment  opportunities  widely
available  helps  to  offset  the  information  isolation  of excluded  groups.  Information  is  a  public
good  that  can be fostered  through easy  and equal  access to communication  channels  and  public
information  disclosure  laws.  Civil  society  organizations  have  an  important  role  in  informing
people about their rights to information.
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The  power  of  newspapers,  books,  post  offices,  telephones,  cellular  telephones,  faxes,  and  the
internet to disseminate  information  quickly is immense.  A Nobel  prize was won by the organizer
of  a  campaign  for  the  signing  of  an  international  treaty  on  land  mines,  who  conducted  the
campaign  largely  from  a  cabin  in  the  woods  in  Vermont,  U.S.A.  Poor,  landless  women  in
Bangladesh  have  become the  ones with  cellular  telephones  and the  power  to  connect  people  to
relatives,  friends or businesses anywhere  in the world, through a program sponsored  by Grameen
Telecom.  Telephones  already  link poor buyers and sellers to daily market prices for commodities
in cities,  thus  changing  their negotiating  power  with  middle-men  in fundamental  ways,  and  the
internet  has  the  potential  for  far  more.  It  is  clear  that  government  investment  in  physical
infrastructure  can play  a critical  role in supporting  connectivity  across  space  and  social  groups.
Examples  include  roads,  power  supply, telephones,  post offices  and  community  halls  that  ease
communication  and movement  of people and  information,  and  provide  space for different  social
groups  to come together.  Civil society organizations  may not be much  involved  in infrastructure
investment,  but they  have an obvious  part to  play in promoting  "connectivity",  and  in educating
people about their rights to information.
Inclusive participation
Citizen voice, participation  and representation  of all social groups in state decision making
generate  consensus,  trust  and  social  learning.  Citizen  and  civil  society  participation  challenges
the  state,  and  at the  same time  keeps the  state accountable.  It is essential  for  citizens  and  civil
society groups to have access to timely and reasonably  independent  information  about state action
and performance,  for example through citizen-led  audits of government.  A good  recent example  is
the  independent  report  produced  by citizen  groups  in India  on the  state of primary  education  in
that  country.  The  findings  of the  report  have  been  made  widely  available,  with  issues  and
findings  reported  and  debated  in  the  national  media.  In  some  areas  in  Rajasthan,  India,  civil
society  pressure  for  information  disclosure  has  led to  village  governments  posting  in  a  public
space  information  on all  government  funds  received and  detailed  accounts  of expenditures.  This
has led to widespread  knowledge of fraudulence,  and in many cases to corrective  action.
Freedom to associate  is a prerequisite  for open participation  and shapes the emergence  of
civil  society  organizations.  In many  countries,  restrictive  and  regressive  civil  society  laws  and
regulations  prevent the emergence  of such groups and  restrict the mobilization  of local resources
39to support civil society action. Tax exemptions and other incentives for the private sector to invest
in  and  connect  with  local  communities, invest in  poor  areas, support  local initiatives  and
leadership development, all  nurture civil  society development and  action  without  loss  of
independence.
State  accountability  and  citizen  choice  are  supported  by  political  pluralism  and
competition at all levels. When citizen groups have the right to elect local and national officials,
they hiave  the potential power to have their interests represented in local governance. The interests
of excluded groups rarely get represented without contentious politics and collective action by
those excluded. But without political pluralism there is rarely any opportunity for recourse.  In
this area, action by civil society organizations  to help excluded groups organize and mobilize is
especially important.
Conflict management mechanisms
Every society has conflict resolution mechanisms to  protect human and property rights.
These are critical to create societies that are socially cohesive, in which people feel secure and are
willing to invest. Laws, regulations and fair treatment of all social groups are critical in generating
trust and social and economic stability. Access to the judiciary and expectations of quick and
'cheap' justice help promote trust and use of the formal system.  Alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms are also important,  so that disputes can be resolved quickly and less formally.
It is obvious that conflict prevention is better than conflict resolution. The problem, as
diplomats and mediators attest, is that there is very little incentive to invest in conflict prevention.
The best strategy is to increase social interaction among those social groups that have little do
with one another. This could involve use of public space in ways that encourages people from
different social and ethnic groups to live, work or engage more frequently together, particularly in
multi-ethnic societies.  Providing high quality public transportation which all social groups use,
and safe public parks, places of worship, community  halls, recreational and sports facilities which
encourage common civic life will lead to much needed 'weak ties' across social groups. Inclusion
of excluded groups in local governance structures is a powerful way of creating new social ties.
The family (however defined) lays the social foundation of societies.  But the state has
important role to  play in providing social and  economic safety nets to protect  families from
breaking apart in the face of violent conflict, and as they adjust to transitions from violence to
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reintegration  of soldiers  into community  life,  retraining,  and  economic  cushions  for  men  and
women to cope with the transition  into new lives.  Civil  society groups  can obviously  play a key
role in such programs.
Education and values
Many  children  and  youth  in  rich  societies  spend  the  ages  between  4 and  22  years  in
educational  institutions.  And  in all countries  the goal includes at  least free primary  education  for
everyone.  It  is clear  from  the  literature  on  social  capital,  as well  as that  on  development,  that
education  and  literacy  matter  for  economic  development.  But  schools  are  also  critical  for  the
socialization  function  they  perform.  Together  with  families,  schools  instill values  that  promote
nationhood,  citizenship,  and ethics,  and that recreate  societies.  While education  is important  for
livelihood  issues,  its  importance  in  generating  social  cohesion  has  been  underestimated  and
overlooked.  The language  of instruction,  the extent of segregation  (official or unofficial)  of social
groups  in schools,  the extent to which the school curriculum  portrays  different  social groups fairly
so  as to  promote  mutual  respect  and  tolerance  - all these  affect  the  probability  of  inter-group
harmony,  even while each group maintains  its distinctive  identity.
The state usually takes primary responsibility  for education,  but civil society organizations
can have a inajor influence on curricula and ensuring adequate  perfornance.
Economic restructuring
Economic  restructuring,  like  civil  service  reform  or  the  construction  of  large  dams,
displaces  large  numbers  of  people.  Depending  on  the  pre-existing  distribution  of  power  and
connectivity  amnong  social groups, access to new opportunities  will also be unequally  distributed.
Unless  careful  attention  is paid  to  the existing  social  institutions,  even  nominally  redistributive
programs  may  reinforce  current  - or create  new - social  and  economic  cleavages.  To  create
opportunities  for the inclusion of previously  excluded  groups means achieving  a new alignment  of
social actors,  and requires an investment  in understanding the existing  social structures, processes
and values.
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understanding  the political and economic context within which reforn has to be shaped.
Governance and decentralization
The impetus behind current decentralization  efforts in more than 70 countries is to bring
governance and  government resources closer to  people.  The goal  is governments that  are
responsive to local needs and accountable to local citizens. However, this will only work if two
types of institutional mechanisms exist to connect ordinary citizens and their local governments in
a two-way flow of information. First, mechanisms are needed for channeling information about
government resources, programs and performnance  to ordinary citizens.  Second, mechanisms are
needed  through  which  local  people  can  channel their  preferences while  maintaining their
independence of government, so that they can voice dissent without repercussions for their
families or social group. The interests of the poor and other marginal groups are not represented
unless such groups mobilize and organize.
Few countries embarking on decentralization programs have such mechanisms in place,
and even fewer invest resources to educate and mobilize local people to perform their new roles as
informed citizens asserting their new rights. The focus is usually on the creation of devolved state
structures rather than on the structure of the society in which these new organizational forms have
to function.  The Law of Popular Participation in Bolivia is one of the few cases where these
institutional mechanisms have been thought through.  Bolivian civil society organizations are
mobilizing efforts to build strong people's organizations, so as to ensure that the Participation
Law works for the benefit of indigenous  groups.
Demand-oriented service delivery
Co-production  between  the  state  and  community  groups  creates  synergy  and
complementarity in the management of local public resources. It also creates local ownership, an
essential ingredient of sustainable projects.  Collective action for the provision of local public
goods, in partnership with  agencies external to  the community, is  important at all levels of
development, even though the form of participation may change over time.  For example, a
person's involvement in a water supply scheme might evolve over the years from collective labor
42to  dig  trenches  and  lay  pipes,  through  membership  on  a  committee,  through  belonging  to  a
cooperative  venture, eventually to being a paying  customer.
Introducing  participation  and  collective  action  in  the  management  of  local  resources
usually  requires  fundamental  shifts  in agency  mission,  roles,  values  and  indicators  of success.
lnstead of seeing themselves  as suppliers of inputs (pipes, sewers,  seedlings,  electricity),  agencies
have to become  supporters  of inclusive  local organizations  and  enablers  of resource  flows.  The
necessary  shifts  in culture  and  the  incentives  facing  agencies  are  difficult  to  bring  about,  but
essential  if changes are to be sustained  over time.
Civil  society  organizations  have  a  long  history  of  helping  communities  to  obtain  and
maintain  services  that were theoretically  provided  by state agencies.  They can be helpful to  state
agencies as the latter feel their way in their new roles.
In summary,  using the  lens of social capital, and  especially  the concepts  of cross-cutting
ties among social groups and governance,  leads to some interesting new insights for policy design.
Interventions  can stem from civil  society, the private  sector, or the state,  and cover  a wide  range
of  fields,  including:  changes  in  rules  so  as  to  include  those  previously  excluded  in  formal
governance  structures,  at  local, regional  and  national  levels;  political  pluralism  and  citizenship
rights; fairness for all social groups  before the law; public access to mediation,  conflict resolution
or  negotiation  councils;  availability  of  public  spaces  that  bring  social  groups  together;
infrastructure  that  eases  communication;  education,  media  and  public  information  policies  that
reinforce  the  norms and values  supporting tolerance  and respect for  diversity;  But  whatever  the
sector or topic,  interventions  need to be designed explicitly  to enhance  complementarity.  That is,
they need to take into account not only their immediate  impact on1  a particular  sector, but also their
contribution  to fostering a rich network  of cross-cutting  ties within society and between  society's
informal and formal institutions.
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